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"An editor ... separates the wheat from the chaff .... "
-Adlai Stevenson
"Editing [is] a bloody trade."
2
-Blake Morrison
Until recently,3 the character-evidence prohibition has been a fixture of the
American common law. 4 The prohibition forbids a litigant from employing
character evidence as circumstantial proof of conductS-that is, in the past the
accused performed an illegal act that shows that he or she has a propensity for
illegal conduct, and accordingly, that propensity increases the probability that
he or she has performed the charged act.
The common law banned the admission of evidence of previous misconduct
because it posed two probative dangers. In order to decide whether to draw the
initial inference, the trier of fact would have to focus on the accused's
personal--or subjective-character. However, that focus creates the probative
danger that the trier of fact will be tempted to decide the case on an improper
basis, namely, the accused's status as a recidivist. 6 In deciding whether to
draw the inference from character to conduct on the charged occasion, there is
also a danger that the trier of fact will attach undue weight to the evidence of
the accused's prior illegal acts.7  Moreover, a large body of psychological
research corroborates the common-law assumption that character is a poor
predictor of conduct on a particular occasion.8
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) codifies the common-law principle. Rule
404(b) reads:
OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
1. LEON A. HARRIS, THE FINE ART OF POLITICAL WIT 238 (1964).
2. Blake Morrison, Black Day for the Blue Pencil, THE OBSERVER, Aug. 6, 2005,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2005/aug 1 06/featuresreviews.guardianreview 1.
3. See FED. R. EVID. 413-15. For a brief history of the genesis of Rules 413-415, see
Michael Teter, Acts of Emotion: Analyzing Congressional Involvement in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 153, 177-87 (2008).
4. See generally I GEORGE E. DIX ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 4 §§ 186-95
(Kenneth S. Broun ed., 2006) (discussing the use of character evidence).
5. 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 2:19, at 2-113
(rev. ed. 2003 & Supp. 2009) [hereinafter 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT
EVIDENCE].
6. Id. § 2:19. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
precludes punishing an accused for his or her status. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666
(1962).
7. 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 2:19, at 2-116
to 2-119.
8. Id. § 2:19.
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admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in
advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on
good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it
intends to introduce at trial. 9
The first sentence of the statute embodies the ban on character reasoning; the
second sentence, however, permits the prosecution to introduce testimony
about an accused's uncharged misconduct when the evidence possesses
genuine noncharacter logical relevance. When the evidence has legitimate
noncharacter relevance, the theory of relevance ordinarily moots the probative
dangers that inspire the character-evidence prohibition.' 0 Such theories do not
require the jury to posit any assumption about the accused's bad character. 1
The introduction of evidence of an accused's other misdeeds is obviously
prejudicial to the accused. Prosecutors appreciate the potential impact of such
evidence at trial; consequently, they proffer the evidence with great frequency.
Dean Charles T. McCormick famously remarked that the Vublished opinions
on this subject are as numerous "as the sands of the sea[s]." Rule 404(b) has
generated more reported decisions than any other provision of the Federal
Rules. 13 In many jurisdictions, the admissibility of uncharged-misconduct
evidence is not only the most frequently litigated issue on appeal, 14 but also the
most common ground for reversal.
In most Rule 404(b) battles, the decisive question is whether the prosecution
can articulate a noncharacter theory of logical relevance that is tenable on the
facts. Consider the following hypothetical case. The charge is attempted
armed robbery, committed on March 1. During the attempt, the robber
dropped a pistol that had a serial number-a one-of-a-kind characteristic. In
order to show the accused's identity as the robber, the prosecution offers
testimony about a larceny from a gun store on February 1. The store's records
indicate that the stolen pistol had a unique serial number-the same number as
9. FED. R. EID. 404(b).
10. 1 IMWNKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 2:22, at 2-127
to 2-128.
11. Id. § 2:22.
12. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 558 n.8 (Edward W.
Clearly ed., 3d ed. 1984).
13. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 404[08], at
404-47.
14. 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5239, at 427 (1978) (footnote omitted); see also Stephen A. Saltzburg, Trial
Tactics: Inextricably Intertwined? Maybe Not, 16 CRIM. JUST. 60, 60 (2001); Jason M. Brauser,
Comment, Intrinsic or Extrinsic?: The Confusing Distinction between Inextricably Intertwined
Evidence and Other Crimes Evidence under Rule 404(b), 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1582, 1583-84
(1994).
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that on the pistol found at the scene of the attempted robbery. The store owner
is prepared to identify the accused as the person who stole the pistol on
February 1. If the defense objects that the testimony is inadmissible character
evidence, the trial judge could overrule the objection under Rule 404(b). The
prosecution, however, will not argue that the prior theft demonstrates that the
accused is a law-breaker and that it is thus more likely that he committed the
charged attempted robbery. On these facts, the evidence actually has much
greater probative value on a noncharacter theory. Without assuming that the
defendant has an antisocial character trait, the prosecution will contend that the
earlier theft put the accused in possession of the unique weapon used in the
subsequent attempted robbery. The judge will admit the evidence and give the
jury a limiting instruction under Federal Rule of Evidence 105 as to the proper
and improper uses of the testimony.
15
In recent years, one of the most controversial theories for admitting
uncharged-misconduct evidence is the argument that, in some sense, the
testimony about the uncharged misconduct is "inextricably intertwined" with
the evidence of the charged crime. 16 The argument contends that the evidence
of the two crimes is inseparable because the two crimes form parts of an
"indivisible criminal transaction."'17 Particularly in drug cases decided since
the late 1970s, courts have invoked the doctrine on numerous occasions to
justify the admission of testimony about an accused's uncharged offenses.
18
15. FED. R. EvID. 105.
16. Milton Hirsch, "This New-Born Babe an Infant Hercules": The Doctrine of
"Inextricably Intertwined" Evidence in Florida's Drug Wars, 25 NOVA L. REV. 279, 292-93
(2000).
17. Id. at 293-94; see also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 14, § 5239, at 446 (footnotes
omitted).
18. One commentator has discussed the surprising vitality of the doctrine as follows:
The past two decades have seen a jurisprudential revolution. During that time, state
and federal appellate courts having jurisdiction over criminal litigation in Florida have
authored some two hundred opinions considering the doctrine .... Most of those
federal opinions are in drug cases, and in those cases, the demised evidence is almost
always found to be admissible ....
Hirsch, supra note 16, at 280. The doctrine has also been applied in non-drug cases. Id. at 280
n. 1.
The number of cases invoking the doctrine continues to mount. See, e.g., United States v.
Watkins, 591 F.3d 780, 784-85 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Conner, 583 F.3d 1011, 1018-19
(7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gutierrez-Castro, 341 F. App'x 299, 300 (9th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Bell, 337 F. App'x 663, 665 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Stephens, 571 F.3d 401,
410 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Johnson, 327 F. App'x 748, 750 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 333 (2009); United States v. Aldridge, 561 F.3d 759, 766 (8th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 78 U.S.L.W. 3393 (2010); United States v. Concepcion, 316 F. App'x 929 (1 1th Cir.
2009) (per curiam); United States v. Rodriguez, 316 F. App'x 612, 614 (9th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Duffy, 315 F. App'x 216, 217 (11 th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); United States v. Hagerman,
555 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); United States v. Romandine, 289 F. App'x 120,
126-27 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Harris, 536 F.3d 798, 807-08 (7th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Juneau, 288 F. App'x 335, 337 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 649 (2008);
[Vol. 59:719
2010] A Procedural Approach to the "Inextricably Intertwined" Theory 723
The doctrine has gained widespread acceptance, and every federal circuit now
recognizes some formulation of it.' 9 The inextricably intertwined doctrine has
even been codified in a few states.2° One commentator has described the
inextricably intertwined doctrine as a "powerful prosecutorial weapon," as well
as a "doctrinal juggemaut."
2'
At the same time, the doctrine has become the target of intense scholarly
22 23 2criticism. Authors of treatises, law review articles, student comments,24
and articles in practitioner journals 25 all have leveled the accusation that the
doctrine is too loose and that it facilitates the admission of otherwise
inadmissible evidence of bad character. Several courts have joined in the
criticism. 26 One United States court of appeals asserted that the doctrine has
27emerged as a convenient vehicle for circumventing Rule 404(b). Another
court of appeals urged the narrow application of the doctrine, stating that the
doctrine's 'very looseness and obscurity' create "'too many opportunities
United States v. Portillo, 287 F. App'x 818, 819 (1 1th Cir. 2008); United States v. Diaz, 285 F.
App'x 709, 714-16 (11 th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Wilson v. Vaughn, 533 F.3d 208, 217 (3d Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1916 (2009); United States v. Stain, 272 F. App'x 618, 621 (9th
Cir. 2008); United States v. Midyett, 603 F. Supp. 2d 450, 459-60 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Cannon v.
United States, 575 F. Supp. 2d 940, 954-55 (C.D. 11. 2008), affd, 326 F. App'x 393 (7th Cir.
2009) (per curiam).
19. Saltzburg, supra note 14, at 63-64.
20. See, e.g., KY. R. EVID. 404(b)(2); see also LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 404(B) (2010);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.035(3) (2007).
21. Hirsch, supra note 16, at 290, 296.
22. See, e.g., I MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404:5, at 705-
13 n.22 (6th ed. 2006); 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 4:33, at 808-09, 818 (3d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2009); 22 WIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 14, § 5239, at 446-50; see also DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE-SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY § 5.2, at 320-24, 327 (Richard D.
Friedman ed., 2009) (introducing the inextricably intertwined doctrine, criticizing any attempt to
revive the res gestae doctrine, and asserting that "treating... evidence as inextricably intertwined
with the charged conduct invites sloppy, non-analytical decision-making").
23. See, e.g., Thomas M. DiBiagio, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence in Federal Criminal
Trials: Is the Admission of Collateral Other-Crimes Evidence Disconnected to the Fundamental
Right to a Fair Trial?, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1229, 1230 (1997); Hirsch, supra note 16, at 280-
81.
24. See, e.g., Brauser, supra note 14, at 1585, 1600-01 (noting the abuse of res gestae as a
means of expanding the doctrine).
25. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 14, at 61, 64-65.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 581 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 175
L. Ed. 2d 1076 (2010); United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 928-29 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United
States v. Ameri, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1169, 1172 (E.D. Ark. 2004).
27. Bowie, 232 F.3d at 927-29.
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for its abuse."' 28 Additionally, at least one United States district court has
condemned the indiscriminate invocation of the doctrine.
29
Despite this constant drumbeat of substantive criticism, the number of cases
invoking the doctrine grows largely unabated.3 ° Some courts have adamantly
refused to tighten the doctrine. The thesis of this Article is that the
substantive criticisms miss the mark. A judge applying the doctrine faces the
essential task of editing or redacting to determine whether the references to the
uncharged misconduct can be excised from the witness's account of the
charged crime without destroying the account's comprehensibility and
credibility. The nature of that task defies the formulation of bright-line tests.
32
A much more promising approach would be to reform the procedures for
administering the doctrine. Part I of this Article describes the doctrine and
distinguishes it from other doctrines related to the character-evidence
prohibition. Part II outlines the criticisms of the doctrine. In light of those
criticisms, Part III of this Article proposes a new set of procedures for applying
the inextricably intertwined doctrine. Finally, Part IV presents the case for
adopting these procedures.
I. A DESCRIPTION OF THE INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED DOCTRINE
A. Distinguishing the Doctrine from Other Rules Related to Uncharged-
Misconduct Evidence
By its terms, Rule 404(b) applies only to "[e]vidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts .... " 33 In other words, only evidence of a misdeed other than
the one or ones alleged in the pleadings is covered by this rule.34  If the
testimony in question describes part of the charged offense, it is "intrinsic"
28. United States v. Hill, 936 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting IA JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 1888 (1983)), amended by 953 F.2d 452, 457
n.I (9th Cir. 1991).
29. Ameri, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 1171-73.
30. In the last three years alone, numerous courts at all levels have continued to invoke the
inextricably intertwined doctrine. See cases cited supra note 18.
31. United States v. SenfTner, 280 F.3d 755, 763-65 (7th Cir. 2002). InSenffner, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit's criticism of the doctrine in Bowie, but refused to narrow the
doctrine, preferring instead a "flexible" application of the doctrine. See id. at 764-65; see also
United States v. Ripinsky, 109 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the defense's argument
that the doctrine should be "limited to circumstances in which it is necessary to introduce such
evidence in order 'to flesh out the circumstances surrounding the crime with which the defendant
has been charged, thereby allowing the jury to make sense of the testimony in its proper context'
(quoting United States v. Ramirez-Jiminez, 967 F.2d 1321, 1327 (9th Cir. 1992))).
32. See Brauser, supra note 14, at 1585.
33. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (emphasis added).
34. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 14, § 5239, at 445.
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rather than "extrinsic," and Rule 404(b)'s strictures are inapplicable. 35 The key
consideration is the interpretation of the charge set out in the pleadings.
36
Conspiracy cases illustrate this point. A conspiracy allegation does not aver
a discrete event; rather, the allegation describes a course of conduct.37 It is true
that the pleadings ordinarily mention one or more specific overt acts
committed in the course of the conspiracy; however, the scope of the allegation
is broader than that. An uncharged overt act can be part of the course of
conduct even if the pleading does not expressly mention it.38 In fact, the act is
direct evidence of the charged conspiracy.39
The courts sometimes mention the "intrinsic" and "inextricably intertwined"
theories in the same breath, but in principle, the two theories are
distinguishable. The former theory is that the testimony is part and parcel of
the charged offense; thus, the wording of the allegation in the pleadings is
expansive enough to encompass the conduct.40 In contrast, when the thrust of
the prosecution's argument is that the testimony about the uncharged
misconduct is "inextricably intertwined" with the charged offense, it is implicit
that there are two separate offenses.4 1 Nevertheless, the prosecution argues
that testimony about the two offenses is so closely related that the court should
admit the evidence of the technically uncharged crime.42  At the most
fundamental level, the inextricably intertwined doctrine must be differentiated
from the contention that the proffered testimony is intrinsic to-and thus
describes part of-the charged crime.
At a second level, the doctrine should be distinguished from the
prosecution's contention that the proffered testimony is logically relevant on a
conventional noncharacter theory. The second sentence of Rule 404(b)
provides an illustrative list of noncharacter theories, "such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident . . . ,43 Consider the first theory mentioned-motive. In
United States v. Hattaway, the accused was charged with kidnapping a
woman. 44 At trial, the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence that before
the kidnapping, the accused had murdered the woman's boyfriend. 45  The
uncharged murder was probative of a possible motive for the kidnapping-the
35. LEONARD, supra note 22, § 5.2, at 320, 327-29.
36. 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 2:11, at 2-62.
37. Id. §2:11, at 2-66 to 2-70.
38. Saltzburg, supra note 14, at 61-65.
39. Id. at 60-61; see also 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 14, § 5239, at 450.
40. 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 2:11, at 2-60
to 2-64, 2-74.
41. Id. § 6:27, at 6-89 to 6-90.
42. Id. § 6:30, at 6-98 to 6-107.
43. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
44. United States v. Hattaway, 740 F.2d 1419, 1422 (7th Cir. 1984).
45. Id. at 1422, 1424.
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accused kidnapped the woman to ensure that she did not reveal details about
the murder of her boyfriend. 46 The same analysis applied in United States v.
Fortenberry.47  In Fortenberry, the accused was charged with unlawful
possession of a shotgun.48 The prosecution offered evidence of an uncharged
double murder as an explanation of "why [the accused] acquired possession of
the shotgun. 'A9 In these two situations, the facts fall squarely within one of the
recognized noncharacter theories of relevance; consequently, there is no need
to resort to the inextricably intertwined doctrine.
In many of the cases in which courts have invoked the doctrine, they could
just as easily have relied on a recognized noncharacter theory, such as
motive. However, by treating the inextricably intertwined theory as a
separate basis for admitting uncharged-misconduct evidence, courts have
announced that this type of evidence can be admitted even when the
prosecution cannot lay a proper foundation for a traditional noncharacter
theory. 51  The reasoning behind this treatment is that there is a special
relationship between the testimony about charged and uncharged crimes that
warrants the admission of evidence of the uncharged offense.
B. The Case for Recognizing the Inextricably Intertwined Doctrine
Suppose that the prosecution is prepared to offer a body of testimony that
includes references to both the charged crime and an uncharged offense. For
present purposes, assume that the proffered testimony about the uncharged
misdeed is not intrinsic to the charged crime. Assume further that the
prosecution cannot establish a foundation for a conventional noncharacter
theory to justify the admission of the testimony about the uncharged misdeed.
Under these circumstances, why should the evidence of the uncharged offense
be admitted at all?
The references to the charged offense are presumptively admissible: because
the charge itself is a fact of consequence under Federal Rule 401,52 thereferences to the charge qualify for admission under Rule 402. 53 Moreover,
46. Id. at 1424-25 (noting that the admission of the evidence "showed the defendants'
possible motivation").
47. 971 F.2d 717 (11th Cir. 1992).
48. Id. at 719.
49. Id. at 721.
50. See LEONARD, supra note 22, § 5.3.2, at 345, 350; 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
14, § 5239, at 449.
51. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 14, § 5239, at 447-49.
52. FED. R. EVID. 401.
53. In pertinent part, Rule 402 provides that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules,
or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority." FED. R. EVID.
402.
Even if an item of evidence qualifies as relevant under Rules 401 and 402, in most cases, the
trial judge, pursuant to Rule 403, has discretionary power to exclude the evidence if he or she
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those references are not subject to Rule 404(b) because they concern the
charged offense itself. As previously stated, Rule 404(b) governs only when
the testimony relates to "other crimes, wrongs, or acts."
54
What is the argument for also admitting the references to the uncharged
misconduct? There are several parallels in the law of evidence-situations in
which the admissibility of one part of a body of evidence justifies bringing in
another part. For instance, Federal Rule of Evidence 411 generally bans
evidence of a civil defendant's liability insurance. 55 The rationale is that the
routine introduction of such evidence might tempt the jury to decide the case
on an improper basis. 56 Suppose that a sympathetic plaintiff had suffered
severe injuries. Even if the showing of the defendant's fault were weak, the
jury might be inclined to impose liability, since the admission of evidence
about the defendant's liability insurance indicates to the jury that the defendant
could pass the liability on to his or her insurer. 57 However, it is well-settled
that "[e]vidence of insurance may be admitted when it is an inseparable part of
an admission of a party bearing on negligence or damages." 58 If the judge
cannot sever the reference to the insurance from the evidence "without
substantially lessening the probative value of the admission," the entire body
of evidence, including the reference to insurance, will come in.59 The
reference to insurance is deemed admissible because it is "inextricably bound
up in the admission ..... 60
The Supreme Court endorsed this underlying principle in its 1997 decision
in Old Chief v. United States. In Old Chief, the accused was charged with
several offenses, including assault with a dangerous weapon and felony
possession of a firearm. 6 2 At trial, the prosecution offered evidence of the
defendant's prior conviction to show his status as a felon. 63 The accused
objected on Rule 403 grounds, claiming that the prejudicial character of the
conviction "outweigh[ed] its probative value." 64 To avoid the prejudice that
would result from a full explanation of the prior conviction, the accused
concludes that the attendant probative dangers, such as prejudice, substantially outweigh the
probative value of the evidence. See id at R. 403. But see id. at R. 609(a)(2) (indicating that a
conviction "involv[ing] dishonesty or false statement" cannot be excluded under Rule 403 if used
to "attack[] the credibility of a witness").
54. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at R. 411.
56. DIx ET AL., supra note 4, § 201, at 810.
57. Id. § 201, at 809-10.
58. Id. § 201, at 812-13.
59. Id. § 201, at 813 n. 19; see also LEONARD, supra note 22, § 6.7.6, at 831-34.
60. Id. § 6.7.6, at 831.
61. 519 U.S. 172, 183, 186-89 (1997).
62. Id. at 174-75.
63. Id. at 174-77.
64. Id. at 175.
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offered to stipulate to his prior felony conviction. 65 The trial judge overruled
the defendant's objection and permitted the prosecution to reject the stipulation
and introduce the conviction.P6 On these facts, the Court held that the trial
judge had erred.6 7
Writing for the majority, Justice David Souter made it clear that in many
cases, the prosecution may reject such stipulations, emphasizing that the
prosecution must present the trier of fact with a narrative that is not only
legally sufficient, but also tells "a colorful story with descriptive richness.
' ' 8
Thus, the prosecution may introduce "robust evidence" in order to tell "[a]
convincing tale," and the defense cannot limit the prosecution to an "abstract
statement[]" that lacks compelling force.69 As a practical matter, to obtain a
conviction, the prosecution's evidence must establish "a convincing" story.
70
The judge should not deny the prosecution a fair opportunity to make a trial
presentation with "evidentiary richness and narrative integrity. 71 In effect, the
prosecution's right to prove the charged crime creates a corollary right to
introduce evidence of details that are necessary to present a coherent,
convincing narrative about the commission of the charged crime. In Rule
404(b) cases, that corollary right arguably justifies the introduction of
references to an uncharged offense that are inextricably intertwined with the
narrative of the charged crime.
II. THE CRITICISMS OF THE INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED DOCTRINE
Although the inextricably intertwined doctrine enjoys wide judicial support,
it has been sharply criticized for two reasons: (1) the doctrine is vague, and (2)
the doctrine's very vagueness makes it prone to abuse. The inextricably
intertwined doctrine is arguably the second coming of the common-law res
gestae principle. As Judge Learned Hand once remarked, this "phrase... has
been accountable for so much confusion that it had best be denied any place
whatever in legal terminology; if it means anything but an unwillinness to
think at all, what it covers cannot be put in less intelligible terms." Dean
John Henry Wigmore was equally critical of the principle, asserting that the
"phrase ... is indefinite in its scope" and, moreover,-"has long been not only
65. Id.
66. Id. at 177.
67. Id. at 174.
68. Id. at 186-89; see also Richard 0. Lempert, Narrative Relevance, Imagined Juries, and
a Supreme Court Inspired Agenda for Jury Research, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 17 (2002)
(describing Justice Souter's approach as protecting the "narrative relevance" of evidence).
69. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 187, 189.
70. Lempert, supra note 68, at 17.
71. Old Chief 519 U.S. at 183; see also LEONARD, supra note 22, § 5.3.2, at 341 (footnote
omitted).
72. United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944).
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entirely useless, but even positively harmful. '73 Other commentators have
described the principle as "mind-numbin, ,74 and one court of appeals has
disparaged the principle as "overly-broad." Despite these condemnations, the
principle found its way into the realm of both hearsay7 6 and uncharged
misconduct.
77
In the uncharged-misconduct context, courts have often invoked the
principle to rationalize the introduction of uncharged offenses committed
simultaneously with the charged crime 78 or perpetrated in the same series of
events as the charged crime. 79 Of course, the mere fortuity of timing does not
itself guarantee that the testimony regarding the uncharged offense will be
found relevant on legitimate noncharacter grounds. 80 Nor does simultaneity
automatically ensure that there is a sound policy justification for admitting
testimony about the uncharged offense.
8 1
"Inextricably intertwined" is the "modem de-Latinized" equivalent of res
82gestae, and it has been savaged by a similar critique. The standard has been
described as "lack[ing] clari7" and "obscure," 3 because it does not embody a
clear substantive principle. Thus, the doctrine functions largely as a
"shibboleth" or "talisman" to be incanted.85  The looseness of the doctrine
allows the courts to engage in "result-oriented" decision-making.8 6 A court
can purport to justify the admission of testimony about uncharged misconduct
"by the simple expedient of describing [the conduct] as 'inextricably
intertwined' with the charged offense.8 7 The vacuous nature of the test's
wording gives courts license to employ sloppy analysis and allows them
73. 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1767, at 253, 255
(1976).
74. 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 22, § 4:33, at 809.
75. United States v. Hill, 953 F.2d 452, 457 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991).
76. Edmund M. Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-45, 59 HARV. L. REV. 481, 568
(1946).
77. 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 5, §§ 6:26-:29, at
6-87 to 6-94.
78. Id. § 6:28, at 6-91.
79. Id. § 6:29, at 6-94 to 6-96.
80. Id. §6:31, at6-116.
81. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 14, § 5239, at 446-47.
82. 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 22, § 4:33, at 809.
83. Hirsch, supra note 16, at 313.
84. Brauser, supra note 14, at 1611.
85. Hirsch, supra note 16, at 294-95.
86. Id. at 280, 313.
87. Id. at 280.
88. LEONARD, supra note 22, § 5.2, at 327; Brauser, supra note 14, at 1604.
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quickly to slip from a conclusory analysis to a desired conclusion.89 Simply
stated, the indefinite phrasing of the doctrine is a virtual invitation for abuse.
90
The doctrine's second criticism is that, worse still, abuse has in fact
occurred. Commentators have noted that courts have frequently applied the
doctrine in an overbroad manner. 91 In the view of one treatise author, some
courts have "lost [their] way." 92 In applying the doctrine, a number of courts
have turned a blind eye to the danger of admitting prejudicial uncharged-
misconduct evidence. 93  Rather than "meticulous[ly] ''94 attempting to
determine whether the testimony about the charged and uncharged crimes
could realistically be severed, the judicial tendency has been to apply the
doctrine in a lax fashion. 95 In case after case, the courts have invoked the
doctrine even though, on careful scrutiny, the testimony about the charged and
uncharged offenses could readily have been separated.96 In these cases,
testimony concerning the different crimes was "anything but inseparable."
97
Although the commentators are virtually unanimous in faulting the courts
for applying the doctrine indiscriminately," this substantive criticism has had
little impact. To the contrary, many courts continue to apply the doctrine as a
matter of course. 99  Unsurprisingly, several courts have expressly brushed
aside the criticism and refused to tighten the inextricably intertwined
doctrine.1°° In the final analysis, the judge's central challenge is editing: can
the judge redact the references to the uncharged misconduct from the body of
testimony without rendering the witness's narrative incomprehensible or
significantly less credible?
It is fanciful to think that the courts can develop hard-and-fast rules to
govern as delicate and fact-sensitive a task as editing. If there is any hope for
89. See Saltzburg, supra note 14, at 63 (arguing that the inextricably intertwined doctrine
often allows evidence to be admitted because "judges are unlikely to exclude evidence that is
perceived as part of the charge brought by the government").
90. 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 22, § 4:33, at 809.
91. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 14, at 64; see also United States v. Hill, 953 F.2d 452,
457 n. I (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that the doctrine is "overly-broad").
92. 1 GRAHAM, supra note 22, § 404:5, at 709 n.22.
93. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 14, § 5239, at 447.
94. Id.
95. LEONARD, supra note 22, § 5.2, at 320.
96. See, e.g., id. § 5.3.2, at 353 (discussing United States v. Moore, 149 F.3d 773, 780 (8th
Cir. 1998), and noting that evidence of the charged and uncharged crimes was admitted even
though "evidence of the uncharged acts was not necessary" to prove that the defendant committed
the charged offense).
97. 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 22, § 4:33, at 809.
98. But see Jennifer Y. Schuster, Uncharged Misconduct Under Rule 404(b): The
Admissibility of Inextricably Intertwined Evidence, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 971 (1988).
99. See cases cited supra note 18.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Senffher, 280 F.3d 755, 763-65 (7th Cir. 2002); United States
v. Ripinsky, 109 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by 129 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1997).
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reining in the doctrine's excesses, that hope lies in revising the procedures by
which the doctrine is administered. Part III below outlines such a set of
revised procedures; Part IV then constructs the case for adopting those
proposed procedures.
III. A NEW SET OF PROCEDURES FOR ADMINISTERING THE INEXTRICABLY
INTERTWINED DOCTRINE
Currently, the doctrine is administered at trial, under time constraints, and
often in the presence of the jury. In most states, the prosecution has no
obligation to give the defense any pretrial notice that it intends to offer
uncharged-misconduct evidence at trial.' 0' Nor must it inform the defense that
it intends to offer the evidence under the inextricably intertwined doctrine.102
The issue usually arises mid-trial.10 3 When the issue does arise, the judge's
options are limited by the jury's presence and time constraints. The following,
then, become the only possibilities: (1) discussing the issue in the jury's
hearing, thereby exposing the jury to the challenged evidence; (2) conducting a
whispered sidebar debate;' 0 4 or (3) excusing the jurors and sending them to the
deliberation room.'0 5 Even when the judge admits references to the uncharged
misconduct, he or she has no obligation to state on the record why he or she
believes that the deletion of the references will impair the narrative integrity of
the prosecution's account of the charged offense-the judge need say only,
"objection overruled." Furthermore, even if the judge admits the references, in
some jurisdictions the judge need not give the jury a limiting instruction as to
the proper and improper uses of the references.' ° 6 These procedures are not
calculated to ensure that the judge engages in the deliberate, careful reflection
necessary for sensitive editing.
In contrast, the following procedures would be more conducive to judicial
reflection and editing:
First, when the prosecution intends to rely on the inextricably
intertwined theory as a basis for introducing references to an accused's
uncharged misconduct, the prosecution should generally be required to
give the defense pretrial notice. The notice ought to (1) synopsize the
101. 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 9:10, at 9-76
to 9-77.
102. Hirsch, supra note 16, at 290-91 (discussing the absence of a notice requirement in
Florida Statutes).
103. Id at 291.
104. See James W. McElhaney, Trial Notebook: Effective Objections, LITIG., Summer 2002,
at 53, 54 ("Federal Judge Robert E. Jones of Portland, Oregon, did some studies on what juries
... don't like [a]nd ... found that juries uniformly hate bench conferences more than any other
part of the trial.").
105. FED. R. EvrD. 103(c).
106. See I IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 9:70, at 9-
230.
Catholic University Law Review
government witness's testimony, including the references to the
uncharged misconduct and (2) indicate that the prosecution
contemplates invoking the inextricably intertwined doctrine to justify
the introduction of the references.
* Upon receipt of the prosecution's notice that it intends to offer
uncharged-misconduct evidence, the defense can file a motion in
limine,107 objecting to the invocation of the doctrine. If the defense
does so, it would be obliged to submit a revised synopsis of the
government witness's testimony, deleting any references to the
uncharged misconduct. The defense may not merely assert that the
references are readily severable; the defense must actually show the
judge, through the revised synopsis, how the severance can be effected.
* After the defense submits its revised synopsis, the prosecution could
file a memorandum opposing the deletion of the references to the
uncharged misconduct and arguing that the deletion impairs the
narrative integrity of the witness's account of the relevant events.
* Based on these filings, the judge would then make a pretrial ruling. If
the judge decided to grant the defense's motion, the prosecution must
refrain from mentioning the references during jury selection and its
opening statement. The prosecution must also instruct the witness to
avoid those references.' °8 However, if the judge denied the motion, the
judge would be obliged to state on the record why he or she believed
that the deletion of the references to the uncharged misconduct would
render the government witness's narrative incomprehensible or
significantly less credible.
" Even if the judge denied the motion, the defense would be entitled to
request a limiting instruction. 109 Similar to a typical limiting instruction
under Rule 105, the instruction would do two things. First, it would
forbid the jury from using the references to the uncharged misconduct
as a basis for determining the defendant's character. Second, it
would explain why the jury is allowed to hear the references to the
107. FED. R. EVID. 103 advisory committee's note.
108. If, after such an admonition, the witness nevertheless referred to the uncharged
misconduct within the jury's earshot, the defense might move for a mistrial. See RONALD L.
CARLSON & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, DYNAMICS OF TRIAL PRACTICE: PROBLEMS &
MATERIALS § 15.3, at 439-41 (4th ed. 2010). Even if the witness violated the court's order by
referring to the uncharged offense, the judge would not necessarily have to grant the motion. In
large part, the judge's ruling would turn on his or her assessment of whether a curative instruction
to the jury to disregard the reference would be effective. I IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED
MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 9:62.
109. 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 9:71, at 9-231
to 9-232.
110. Id. §§ 9:72-:73, at 9-235 to 9-236.
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uncharged misconduct. I I By way of example, suppose that the
prosecution's evidence was an audiotape recording on which the
accused both described the charged offense and boasted about the
uncharged misconduct. 12 The references to the uncharged misconduct
might be so closely commingled'' 3 with the statements about the
charged crime that the redaction of the references would garble the tape
to the point of incomprehensibility. If that was the only reason for the
judge's ruling permitting the jury to hear the references, the jury would
be told precisely that.
IV. THE CASE FOR ADOPTING THE NEW PROCEDURES FOR ADMINISTERING
THE INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED DOCTRINE
In four significant respects, the adoption of the procedures outlined above
would put the judge in a much better position to make the editing decisions
necessary to rule on the application of the inextricably intertwined doctrine.
A. The Prosecution's Duty to Give the Defense Pretrial Notice
Under the status quo, the defense often receives no advance notice that the
prosecution intends either to offer uncharged-misconduct evidence or to rely
on the inextricably intertwined doctrine to justify its admission. It is true that
several states require the prosecution to give the defense pretrial notice that the
government intends to offer uncharged-misconduct evidence at trial." 14 These
provisions typically require the government to describe the evidence at least in
general terms. 15  However, just over one-fifth of the states require the
government to give such notice.116 Prior to 1991, Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) did not impose any requirement for pretrial notice. However, in 1991,
the rule was amended to provide that "upon request by the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of
trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, or
the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.""11
7
Significantly, the Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 1991
amendment stated that the requirement "does not extend to evidence of acts
111. Id. § 9.73, at 9-236.
112. 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 22, § 4:33, at 814 (explaining that if the
accused commingles references to the charged and uncharged crimes, the statements about the
uncharged acts may be admissible).
113. Id.
114. 1 1MWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 9:10, at 9-77
to 9-78 (noting that Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming require that the defense
be given pretrial notice of the prosecution's anticipated use of uncharged misconduct).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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which are 'intrinsic' to the charged offense ....",18 As explained in Part I, on
close examination an elementary distinction exists between admitting evidence
because it is truly intrinsic to the charged offense and admitting evidence that
is intertwined with the charged offense.' 19 However, the courts have tended to
lump the two situations together and dispense with pretrial notice in cases in
which the government relied on the inextricably intertwined theory.12° Even
when Rule 404(b)'s notice provision applies, the provision does not require the
prosecution to specify the theory on which it intends to rely to justify the
admission of the uncharged-misconduct evidence.
Deferring the ruling on the application of the inextricably intertwined
doctrine is far from ideal. At trial, the judge may have to resolve a difficult
editorial question: if the government witness proposes to give his or her
account of the relevant events, would the deletion of references to the
defendant's uncharged misconduct impair the narrative integrity of the account
as a whole? Anyone who has edited the manuscript of a book, appellate brief,
pleading, or law review article can appreciate how difficult and time-
consuming editing can be. Editing can be "a bloody trade,", 21 requiring long,
hard thought. In some cases, an editor can deftly remove a huge part of a draft
without distorting the moral of the story. By contrast, in other instances,
changing a single word can profoundly alter the meaning of a sentence, a
paragraph, or even the entire narrative. Given the stakes, the judge's editorial
decision under the inextricably intertwined doctrine should be considered122
thoughtfully. Time constraints and the presence of a jury understandably
generate pressure for relatively quick decisions at trial. In the "hurly burly" 1
of that setting, the judge may find it extremely difficult to engage in deliberate,
careful editing. In particular, if he or she attempted the necessary editing at
sidebar with a jury impatiently waiting, the doctrine is far more likely to be
misapplied.
B. The Requirement that the Prosecution and Defense Exchange Synopses of
the Witness's Account of the Relevant Events
Requiring the two sides to exchange their competing drafts would enhance
the fairness of the judge's ultimate decision. If the editing issue arises midtrial,
the defense, at sidebar, may have to explain orally why it believes that all
references to the uncharged misconduct may be excised from the witness's
account. It is expecting a good deal to require the defense to propose editorial
deletions without any advance notice. Under these circumstances, the judge is
118. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note.
119. See supra Part I.A.
120. 1 GRAHAM, supra note 22, § 404:5, at 711-12 n.22; LEONARD, supra note 22, § 5.2, at
327; 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 22, § 4:33, at 818.
121. Morrison, supra note 2.
122. See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 315 n.256.
123. Id.
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asked to make a final editorial decision on the spot. After all, the judge
probably knows less about the facts of the case than either the prosecutor or
defense counsel. The judge can make a higher quality decision if he or she is
presented with two written synopses of the witness's account and afforded
ample time to painstakingly compare the two.
The proposed procedure follows the approach taken by the appellate court in
United States v. Moussaoui.124  Zacarias Moussaoui was charged with six
counts of conspiracy in connection with the September 11, 2001, attacks.' 25 In
preparation for trial, Moussaoui requested access to an enemy-combatant
witness, Ramzi Binalshibh, who would testify that Moussaoui was not
involved in the attacks. 126 The government was concerned that the witness
would disclose potentially sensitive information and refused to allow
Moussaoui access to him. In the lower court, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the trial judge proposed that
Moussaoui interview the witness via satellite with a time-delay, allowing
intelligence officials to protect privileged information from disclosure., 28 The
judge held that Moussaoui's right to a fair trial required the government to
produce witnesses, "presumably in Government custody, who may be able to
provide favorable testimony on [Moussaoui's] behalf."1 29  When the
government refused to comply, rather than dismissing the charges, the judge
merely removed the possibility of the death penalty.
130
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and, in
doing so, looked to the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), which
provides for sanctions "only if the government has failed to produce an
124. United States v. Moussaoui (Moussaoui 1), 333 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 2003).
125. Id. ("[Moussaoui] is charged with conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism transcending
national boundaries .... conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy .... conspiracy to destroy aircraft,
. . . conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, . . . conspiracy to murder United States
employees, .. . and conspiracy to destroy property .... ").
126. Phil Hirschkom & Kelli Arena, Moussaoui Request Risks National Security, U.S.
Argues, CNN.COM, June 3, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/06/03/moussaoui.triaU/ (last
visited Apr. 13, 2010); see also Moussaoui I, 333 F.3d at 513; Siobhan Roth, 4th Circuit to Take
Up Rules for Terror Trials, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 1, 2003, at 1. Moussaoui additionally requested
to speak with two other enemy-combatant witnesses. Moussaoui I, 333 F.3d at 513 n.5. The
district court denied the request because "Moussaoui and standby counsel had failed to establish
that the individuals would provide material, admissible testimony." Id.
127. Moussaoui I, 333 F.3d at 512.
128. Siobhan Roth, Terror Case Could Redraw Lines of Power, LEGAL TIMES, July 21, 2003,
at I.
129. United States v. Moussaoui (Moussaoui 11), 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 482 (E.D. Va. 2003).
130. Id. at 487. Moussaoui argued that dismissal of the charge was appropriate in accordance
with the Classified Information Procedures Act; the prosecution did not argue to the contrary. Id.
at 482; see Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(e)(2) (2006) (providing the
court with the ability either to dismiss indictments or information where "the interests of justice
would not be served by dismissal" or to provide other appropriate sanctions).
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adequate substitute for the classified information."'' 31 The court rejected the
trial judge's conclusion that substitute statements would be inadequate.1
32
However, to prevent the government from drafting the substitute statements
alone, the court created "an interactive process among the parties and the
district court." 133 In effect, the process contemplated an exchange of synopses
between the prosecution and defense.
The government would begin the process of generating the substitute
statement by preparing an original draft using the precise language of the
witness's existing records as much as possible.' 34  Next, the defense would
identify the portions that it would attempt to admit into evidence at trial.
35
Then, the government could seek to include additional portions of the evidence
in the substitute statement "in the interest of completeness.' 36  After this
exchange, the trial judge would decide whether the resulting substitutions are
admissible and, if so, how to inform the jury of the substitutions. The Fourth
Circuit later clarified and refined these procedures.' 37  Ultimately, the issue
became moot when Moussaoui decided to plead guilty.1
38
131. United States v. Moussaoui (Moussaoui Ill), 365 F.3d 292, 313 (4th Cir. 2004). The
Classified Information Procedures Act provides that
upon any determination by the court authorizing the disclosure of specific classified
information under the procedures established by this section, the United States may
move that ... the court order-
(A) the substitution for such classified information of a statement admitting relevant
facts that the specific classified information would tend to prove; or
(B) the substitution for such classified information of a summary of the specific
classified information.
18 U.S.C. app. § 6(c)(1).




136. Id.; see FED. R. EVID. 106 (codifying the rule of completeness). However, in this
process, the government cannot "bolster its own case by offering what it considers to be
inculpatory statements." Moussaoui II1, 365 F.3d at 316. The Fourth Circuit noted that the jury
must at least be informed "that the substitutions are what the witnesses would say if called to
testify; that the substitutions are derived from statements obtained under conditions that provide
circumstantial guarantees of reliability[;] ... and that neither the parties nor the district court has
ever had access to the witnesses." Id.
137. United States v. Moussaoui (Moussaoui IV), 382 F.3d 453, 480-82 (4th Cir. 2004)
(clarifying standards for admissibility of summaries). For a concise summary, see Fourth Circuit
Modifies Ruling on Accused Terrorist's Access to Witnesses, 75 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 615, 616
(2004) ("The process the court set forth for creating substitute witness statements is an interactive
one, involving the district court and both parties. . . . The process will begin when defense
counsel identifies particular portions of the summaries it seeks to admit into evidence. The
government may then argue that additional portions must be included in the interest of
completeness.... As much as possible,... the statements should use the exact language of the
documents from which they are derived.").
138. United States v. Moussaoui (Moussaoui V), 591 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2010).
[Vol. 59:719
2010] A Procedural Approach to the "Inextricably Intertwined" Theory 737
In the context of prosecutions such as Moussaoui's, the trial judge faces a
more difficult editorial task than the judge would confront under the procedure
posed here for Rule 404(b) cases. In 404(b) cases, the body of evidence
includes references to two distinct offenses. In terrorism prosecutions, such as
Moussaoui's, the entire body of evidence may relate to a single crime.
Moreover, the stakes will often be higher in terrorism prosecutions. To be
sure, in both the terrorism setting and in a 404(b) case, the judge is concerned
about according the accused a fair opportunity to present a defense. However,
terrorism prosecutions may also involve full-fledged state secrets and implicate
vital national-security interests. If the collaborative process outlined by the
Fourth Circuit is acceptable and feasible in terrorism prosecutions, it should
certainly be a viable procedure in cases in which the judge must make editorial
decisions under the inextricably intertwined doctrine.
C. The Trial Judge's Ruling: Deciding whether the References to the
Uncharged Misconduct Are Inextricably Intertwined with the Witness's
Account of the Charged Offense
In the past, there were few constraints on a trial judge's ruling under the
inextricably intertwined doctrine. Substantively, the judge applied the vague
standard of whether the references to the uncharged misdeed were
"inseparable" from the witness's testimony about the charged crime. The
judge might supplement the inseparability standard by quoting the reference to
"narrative integrity" in Old Chief,3 9 but even that supplemented/ standard
provides little guidance. Procedurally, even if the trial judge admitted the
references only because he or she concluded that redacting those references
would leave a gap in the witness's testimony that would pose troubling
questions for the jury, the judge was not required to state that conclusion on the
record or to identify the gap. 140 The judge simply had to overrule the defense's
objection. Both the substantive and the procedural constraints on the judge's
ruling should be toughened.
Substantively, the judge ought to admit the references to the uncharged
misconduct under a two-pronged test: the references should be admitted only if
redacting them would render the witness's account of the charged crime either
(1) incomprehensible or (2) significantly less credible.
1. Incomprehensibility
In some cases, the judge should admit references to uncharged misconduct
because their exclusion would render the witness's narrative incomprehensible
or hard to understand. 14 1 For example, the judge might find that the references
139. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 183 (1997).
140. Brauser, supra note 14, at 1607 n.157.
141. United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1992); see also I
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 22, § 4.33, at 811-12.
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are "linguistically inseparable" from the testimony about the charged crime. 
42
Such a finding is especially likely when the evidence takes the form of a
writing, audiotape, or videotape. Suppose the prosecution intends to offer
into evidence a recording of the suspect offering to sell marijuana. On the
same tape, the accused might make damning admissions about the charged
crime while boasting about other misdeeds.' 4 When a potential drug buyer
asks about the price for marijuana, the accused might respond by quoting a
price and by emphasizing how low it is by contrasting it with the price he
normally charges for methamphetamine.145 In these situations, if the judge
attempted to redact the words, phrases, or clauses mentioning the uncharged
misconduct, the admissible remainder of the evidence might be unintelligible
to the jury. 146 Instances of linguistic inseparability present the strongest case
for applying the inextricably intertwined doctrine. When a writing or tape
exists, the prosecution should be permitted to present it to the jury; otherwise,
the trial could degenerate into a "he said, she said" swearing contest between
the accused and an informant. The prosecution would need the writing or tape
to break the credibility tie. When references to the uncharged misconduct are
closely commingled with the testimony about the charged offense, the
prosecution should not be forced to present the evidence in garbled and
confusing forn.
147
2. A Significant Reduction in the Narrative's Legitimate Credibility
However, those instances of extreme linguistic inseparability are not the
only times the inextricably intertwined doctrine may be invoked. It is also
defensible to invoke the doctrine when the redaction of the references to the
uncharged misdeed would significantly reduce the legitimate credibility of the
witness's account of the charged crime.
The term "legitimate" is used advisedly here. References to the accused's
uncharged misconduct always enhance the credibility of the remainder of the
witness's testimony-albeit in an illegitimate manner-by inviting the jury to
engage in forbidden character reasoning. 148  The uncharged misconduct
142. Schuster, supra note 98, at 966.
143. United States v. Price, 877 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1980) (explaining that "statements
[on an audiotape] are understandable only in context and cannot be severed from the remaining
taped conversation").
144. See, e.g., United States v. Concepcion, 316 F. App'x 929, 932 (11th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (explaining that the accused discussed prior dealings with a drug cartel with a
confidential informant); United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 85-88 (4th Cir. 1980) (remarking
that in some of the taped conversations, the defendant was boasting about his ability to supply
weapons to customers); see also I MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 22, § 4:33, at 814.
145. See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 298-99.
146. Id. at 299.
147. 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 22, § 4:33, at 814; Hirsch, supra note 16, at
298-99; Schuster, supra note 98, at 967-68.
148. 22 WRIGHT& GRAHAM, supra note 14, § 5248, at 520-21.
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"corroborates" the witness and increases the overall credibility of the witness's
testimony about the charged crime because if the accused did it once (the
uncharged act), it is more likely that he did it again (the charged act). 14 9 To
properly invoke the inextricably intertwined doctrine under this alternative test,
the prosecution must point to another way in which excising the references to
the uncharged misconduct significantly impairs the credibility of the witness's
testimony. The alternative method must still preclude the jury from resorting
to impermissible character reasoning.
There are occasions, however, when the prosecution can satisfy this
substantive standard. In some cases, the exclusion of the uncharged
misconduct will create a geographic gap in the case that many jurors would
find puzzling. 150 An Arkansas case, Rhodes v. State, is illustrative. I 1 In
Rhodes, most of the witnesses at trial were either prison inmates or prison
guards. 12 It would have been extremely "awkward ' 153 to have "sanitized" the
testimony by ordering all of the witnesses to refrain from mentioning that the
site of the events was a prison in which the accused was incarcerated. 
154
Without the benefit of the witnesses' complete testimony, some of the jurors
might become skeptical of the prosecution's narrative because they may sense
that the prosecution and its witnesses are obviously withholding certain facts.
Accordingly, the jurors would have an uneasy feeling that the prosecution and
its witnesses were hiding the whole truth. In Old Chief Justice Souter
addressed this very problem:
[T]he effect may be like saying, "never mind what's behind the
door," and jurors may well wonder what they are being kept from
knowing.
• . .People who hear a story interrupted by gaps . ..may be
puzzled at the missing chapters, and jurors asked to rest a
momentous decision on the story's truth can feel put upon at being
asked to take responsibility knowing that more could be said than
they have heard.
The most sensible solution is to allow the witnesses to mention facts regarding
the uncharged misconduct and to instruct the jurors that they cannot reason that
the accused's past criminal activity made it more probable that he committed
the charged offense.
149. 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 6:5.
150. United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Such evidence can be
proper to enable the jurors to make sense of the evidence pertaining to the criminal activity of
which the defendant is currently accused, . . . and to avoid puzzling them by making them think
that facts important to their understanding of the case are being concealed." (citation omitted)).
151. 716 S.W.2d 758 (Ark. 1958).
152. Id. at 762.
153. Schuster, supra note 98, at 966.
154. Brauser, supra note 14, at 1607.
155. Old Chiefv. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997).
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By the same token, the exclusion of uncharged misconduct will sometimes
create a temporal or chronological hole 156 or lacuna 157 in the prosecution's
narrative. United States v. Yusufu is a case in point. 158 In Yusufu, there was "a
three-year gap" in the chronology between the time the accused formed the
plan to commit the charged crime and when the accused was convicted and
imprisoned for another crime. 59 Suppose that the prosecution called witness A
to testify to the accused's development of the plan to commit the charged
offense. According to witness A, the accused stated that he was ready to
immediately execute the plan. The prosecution then calls witness B to testify
about the execution of the plan. The difficulty is that when the prosecution's
narrative picks up with witness B, three years have already passed. The
seemingly inexplicable time lapse might prompt the jury to discount
improperly the credibility of witness A's testimony; according to witness A, the
accused had said that he was ready to execute the plan immediately, but he
evidently did nothing for three years. To prevent that improper discounting,
the prosecution ought to be permitted to reveal that the accused had spent those
three years in prison for another crime. However, out of fairness to the
accused, the jury should be instructed that although the accused was convicted
of another crime, the jurors cannot rely on that misconduct as a basis for
inferring that the accused has a propensity for committing the charged crime.
When the prosecution invokes this second substantive test for inextricability,
the judge must inquire whether there is a real possibility that barring any
mention of the uncharged misconduct will cause a rational juror to perceive a
troubling void in the prosecution witnesses' narrative. 160 Will the exclusion of
all references to the uncharged misconduct create a gaping hole,' thereby
rendering the narrative substantially less credible by making it appear
suspiciously incomplete? 162 If the judge concludes that the exclusion would
156. Brauser, supra note 14, at 1606.
157. Hirsch, supra note 16, at 298.
158. 63 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 1995).
159. Id. at 511-12.
160. LEONARD, supra note 22, § 5.3.2, at 348.
161. Hirsch, supra note 16, at 298.
162. Schuster, supra note 98, at 967. Some commentators suggest that this test is satisfied
when barring the uncharged misconduct will result in "a spatial, temporal, or causal" hole in the
government's case. Id. at 971. As in the Rhodes and Yusufu cases, the creation of a spatial or
temporal gap in the prosecution's narrative may justify admitting the references to the uncharged
misconduct. However, the reference to a causal hole is dubious. It is true that the government's
narrative should be complete both legally and psychologically: "[u]nderstanding why the actor
might do something gives . . . meaning to the action and makes the action more likely to have
occurred." Dana K. Cole, Psychodrama and the Training of Trial Lawyers: Finding the Story, 21
N. ILL. U. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2001). Although the substantive law of crimes does not require proof
of a motive, prosecutors realize that in the typical case, they must show a motive: jurors are not
inclined to believe that the accused committed a completely senseless crime without any motive.
However, as Part I noted, motive is an expressly recognized noncharacter theory of admissibility
under Rule 404(b). FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Thus, when the evidence is logically relevant to the
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have that effect, under the proposed substantive test, the judge may
legitimately rely on the inextricably intertwined theory.
However, as previously stated, to effectively regulate the judge's discretion
under the theory, procedural safeguards must also be put in place. When a
prosecutor proffers uncharged misconduct under Rule 404(b) or its state
counterpart, many jurisdictions now mandate both that the prosecutor
specifically identify the noncharacter theory upon which he or she is relying
and that the trial judge make explicit findings as to that theory.'6 3 These
requirements not only promote better decision-making by the trial judge, but
also facilitate more probing appellate review of the trial judge's decision. In
the past, even when the trial judge purported to rely on the argument that
banning any mention of the uncharged misconduct would create a troublesome
chronological void in the prosecution's case, neither the prosecutor nor the
judge was obliged to identify that void. 164 Appellate courts should no longer
accept such conclusory analysis. 165 Trial judges ought to demand that the
prosecutor identify the specific gap that allegedly destroys the integrity of the
witness's narrative, and in turn, appellate courts should insist that the trial
judge make an explicit finding as to whether the specified gap would likely
have that destructive effect. These procedural mandates could significantly
improve the administration of the inextricably intertwined doctrine.
D. The Administration of a Limiting Instruction Explaining the Reason Why
the Jury Is Being Permitted to Hear the References to the Uncharged
Misconduct
As Part IV.A noted, most jurisdictions do not require the prosecution to
notify the defense before trial that the government intends to offer uncharged-
misconduct evidence at trial. 166  Moreover, even those jurisdictions that
mandate pretrial notice do not demand that the prosecution identify the theory
on which it intends to rely as the justification for admitting the evidence. In
contrast, the almost universal view is that when the judge admits evidence of
uncharged misconduct on a noncharacter theory at the defense's request, he or
she must give the jury a limiting instruction under Rule 105.167 The instruction
forbids the jurors from using the evidence as a basis for character reasoning,
accused's motive, the evidence should be admitted on that basis rather than resorting to the
inextricably intertwined theory.
163. 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 5, §§ 9:32, 9:56.
164. Brauser, supra note 14, at 1607 & n.157.
165. Id. at 1608-09, 1617.
166. See supra Part V.A.
167. 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 9:70; see also
FED. R. EVID. 105.
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but exlains that they may use the evidence on a specified noncharacter
theory.
Further, the Advisory Committee Note to the Rule 404(b) amendment
requiring pretrial notice states that the notice requirement does not apply to
acts "intrinsic" to the charged misconduct-behavior that is truly part of the
charged crime. 169 Several jurisdictions have blurred the distinction between
the intrinsic and inextricably intertwined theories and, for that reason, held that
inextricably intertwined conduct does not trigger the notice requirement.' 70 A
similar blurring has occurred with respect to the limiting instruction that
normally accompanies uncharged-misconduct evidence.' 7 1 Additionally, there
has been a marked judicial trend of holding that the judge need not give any
instruction on inextricably intertwined misconduct.' 72  However, this trend
away from instructing the jury is misguided. The judge should give the jury a
limiting instruction that identifies both the permissible and impermissible uses
of the evidence.
The jury certainly needs the guidance of an instruction forbidding it from
engaging in character reasoning. It would be a different matter if the conduct
in question were truly intrinsic to the charged crime. If the evidence describes
such intrinsic conduct, the jury need not rely on any forbidden, intermediate
character inference; the evidence is directly probative of the charged offense.
In contrast, when the judge admits evidence under the inextricably intertwined
theory, he or she admits evidence of another offense-a distinct common-law
offense or the violation of a different penal statute. In the latter situation, the
jury ma ¢ well engage in character reasoning-a natural inclination of lay
jurors. After all, in the jurors' minds, the other misdeed may tend to show
that the accused has a disposition or propensity for criminal conduct.' 74 The
jurors' common-sense notions of personality may well prompt them to reason
that if the defendant committed the act once, he probably committed it
again.175 With no contrary guidance, there is a grave risk that the jurors will do
so. In cases such as Rhodes,176 once a lay juror learns that the accused has
already been convicted of a crime, the juror may leap to the conclusion that the
168. 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 5, §§ 9:73-:74;
see also FED. R. EVID. 105.
169. See supra Part IV.A.
170. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
171. See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 291.
172. See, e.g., 1 GRAHAM, supra note 22, § 404:5, at 713-14 n.22; 1 MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 22, § 4:33, at 818; Hirsch, supra note 16, at 291; Saltzburg, supra note
14, at 64; Schuster, supra note 98, at 950 n.ll (citing United States v. Martin, 794 F.2d 1531,
1533 (11 th Cir. 1986)).
173. 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 1:03, at 1-11.
174. Id. § 1:03, at 1-8 to 1-9, 1-11 ("Uncharged misconduct evidence poses a serious risk...
because the evidence routinely supports two inferences-one legitimate and one illicit.").
175. Id. §9:73, at 9-237; see also id. § l:03, at 1-10 to 1-11.
176. See Rhodes v. State, 716 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Ark. 1986).
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accused is precisely the sort of person likely to commit the charged offense.
To prevent jurors from relying on character reasoning, the judge must provide
guidance and inform them that such reasoning is not permitted.
The limiting instruction should not only explicitly forbid character
reasoning, but it should also affirmatively tell the jurors why they are being
permitted to hear the references to the uncharged misconduct. Suppose that the
judge decided to admit audiotape references to uncharged misconduct, such as
other drug sales, on the ground that the references are linguistically inseparable
from the evidence about the charged crime. The redaction of the references
would reduce the audiotape to a garbled recording. In that situation, as Dean
Wigmore emphasized, the references serve no legitimate "evidential
purpose."'177 The jury may not employ character reasoning, the misconduct is
not intrinsic to the charged offense, and the prosecution has failed to articulate
a noncharacter theory of logical relevance. The jury is hearing the references
only because the judge could not excise those references without destroying
the comprehensibility of the audiotape. If that is the rationale for the judge's
ruling, the jury should be told frankly that that is the only reason they are being
allowed to hear the references to the earlier misconduct.
178
Assume alternatively that the judge decided to admit the references because
their omission would create a puzzling void in the prosecution witness's
narrative of the charged crime. 79 Three years have elapsed because, in the
interim, the accused had been convicted of crime two, preventing him from
immediately carrying out the plan for crime one. Crime two is not intrinsic to
crime one by any stretch of the imagination, and the prosecution cannot
identify any traditional noncharacter theory, such as motive, for admitting the
evidence of crime two. If the evidence of the accused's commission and
conviction of crime two is to be admitted, it is because omitting any reference
to crime two might lead the jurors to discount improperly the credibility of the
testimony proffered by the government witnesses about crime one. If the judge
then relies on this "completing-the-story" justification for admitting the
evidence, he or she should explicitly inform the jury of that reason. Many
jurors are unaccustomed to refined circumstantial reasoning, and if they are to
use the references properly, they need guidance from the trial judge.
V. CONCLUSION
It is undeniable that the courts have made little progress in refining the
substantive test under the inextricably intertwined doctrine. It is equally clear
that in a number of cases, the courts have invoked the doctrine even though it
seemingly would have been possible to sever the references to uncharged
177. 6 WIGMORE, supra note 73, § 365, at 346.
178. See Pope v. State, 632 A.2d 73, 76-77 (Del. 1993).
179. United States v. Yusuf, 63 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1995).
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misconduct from the body of evidence describing the accused's commission of
the charged crime.
Admittedly, there has been some movement in the right direction. Several
courts have criticized the judicial tendency to apply the doctrine with laxity,'
80
and in the past few years, the number of courts subjecting prosecution
arguments premised on the doctrine to close scrutiny has gradually
increased. 81
However, in the long term, the real hope for reining in the doctrine is
procedural reform. In the final analysis, when the judge determines the
applicability of the doctrine in a given case, he or she must make an editorial
decision: can the prosecution witness's account be edited by deleting the
references to the uncharged misconduct without changing the essential
meaning and integrity of the witness's narrative of the charged crime? Anyone
who has had significant editing experience realizes how difficult and time-
consuming editing can be. It is wishful thinking to believe that appellate
courts will ever formulate a clear-cut substantive test that trial judges can
easily apply to determine whether to admit references to the uncharged
180. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 581 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 927-29 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Ameri, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1168,
1169 (E.D. Ark. 2004).
181. United States v. Stephens, 571 F.3d 401, 409-11 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that
evidence that the accused created a bogus website purporting to be that of a disaster-relief
organization was not inextricably intertwined with testimony that the accused had previously
created an unrelated bogus website to fraudulently obtain donations for hurricane relief); United
States v. Romandine, 289 F. App'x 120, 125, 127 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that evidence that the
accused had in the past used drugs with restaurant employees was not inextricably intertwined
with the allegation that the accused had set fire to the restaurant); United States v. Stain, 272 F.
App'x 618, 621 (9th Cir. 2008) (remarking that evidence of the accused's involvement with
marijuana was not inextricably intertwined with the charged offenses); United States v. Midyett,
603 F. Supp. 2d 450, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) ("'[T]he charged ... crime is straightforward and may
be fully understood without reference to [evidence of the uncharged and alleged crime]."'
(quoting United States v. Newton, No. S1 01-cr-635, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2414, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2002))); see also United States v. Utter, 97 F.3d 509, 513-15 (11 th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that the uncharged misconduct was "tangential" to the charged offense); United
States v. Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11 th Cir. 1992) (stating that the evidence admitted
under this doctrine should be "[c]arefully circumscribed"); United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d
338, 343-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that evidence was not "intricately related"); United States v.
Swiatek, 819 F.2d 721, 727 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the case would not suffer from holes in
the story should evidence be excluded); United States v. Mahaffy, 477 F. Supp. 2d 560, 566
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that the uncharged scheme "was a separate, discrete offense that may be
conceptually segregated from the charged offenses without impairing the jury's ability to
understand the facts underlying the schemes alleged in the indictment" (footnote omitted));
United States v. Alex, 790 F. Supp. 801, 803-04 (N.D. I11. 1992) (explaining that evidence that
the accused had a criminal relationship with a prosecution witness for thirty-five years was not
"inextricably intertwined" with the charged crime); People v. Agado, 964 P.2d 565, 570 (Colo.
App. 1998) (stating that the courts should be "cautious" in applying the res gestae doctrine);
Hirsch, supra note 16, at 305 (discussing how the Florida state courts have not been as receptive
to invocations of the doctrine as the federal courts have been).
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misconduct. 182 The nature of the editorial task requires trial judges to make
"case-by-case determinations" tied to "the individual facts in each case."' 8 3
Even if all the procedural changes proposed in this Article are implemented,
they will not guarantee that trial judges will make the right editorial decision in
every case.
However, the current procedures for administering the inextricably
intertwined doctrine virtually guarantee that trial judges will be wrong in many
cases. Realistically, the requisite editing cannot routinely be done at a hurried
mid-trial bench conference. A judge would never dream of editing the draft of
even a short opinion in that fashion; moreover, no competent practitioner
would think of editing the draft of an important pleading or memorandum in
that manner. The stakes are too high to continue to rely on the current
procedures. As Justice Benjamin Cardozo warned, the introduction of
uncharged-misconduct evidence can be a "peril to the innocent."' i 4  The
judge's ruling on the admissibility of uncharged-misconduct evidence is often
the "turning point" in the trial.' 8 5 Therefore, the procedures in place should
ensure that when the judge is asked to make this crucial editing decision, he or
she has ample opportunity to balance carefully the interests of the state with
the rights of the accused. The procedures should give the judge the time and
procedural tools to separate the charged wheat from the uncharged chaff.
182. Brauser, supra note 14, at 1585 (noting that "no court has been able to articulate a bright
line test" to be used when applying the doctrine).
183. Id at 1607.
184. People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930).
185. See I IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 1:02, at
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